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I. Introduction
Parents can attain utility not only from their consumption but also 
from their children’s consumption. The motivation of having, nurturing, 
and educating children is called parental altruism, which is the 
intergenerational linkage examined by Becker and Barro (1988, 1989). 
In addition to this downward altruistic behavior, young adults also 
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spend resources in caring for their elderly parents. They do so because 
their parents’ consumption directly increases their utility. Although filial 
altruism co-exists with parental altruism, it has not received research 
attention similar to that of parental altruism.
Are individuals more parentally or filially altruistic? Do the differences 
in degrees of altruism affect the levels of economic development? The 
majority of the literature on endogenous fertility assumes that young 
agents are altruistic toward children and bear children out of love 
(Becker and Barro 1988; Ehrlich and Lui 1991). Fewer studies suggest 
that when people are altruistic toward their elderly parents, they raise 
children as assets (Boldrin and Jones 2002; Nishimura and Zhang 
1992, 1995). Although the abovementioned studies do not argue which 
types of altruism are prevalent in specific countries, Horioka (2014) find 
that Americans and Indians generally leave bequests due to parental 
altruism. Meanwhile, the Japanese and Chinese are concerned with 
self-interest and exchange bequests with old-age support. Blackburn 
and Cipriani (2005) studied fertility decisions when people are altruistic 
toward their children and parents. Their two-sided altruism model 
reveals that, as an economy develops, intergenerational transfers from 
children to parents are superseded by those from parents to children, 
thus leading to a decline in fertility. Their result implies that people 
in highly developed economies are parentally altruistic, whereas those 
in less developed economies are filially altruistic. Notably, dependent 
old agents do not exist in the two-period overlapping-generation model 
proposed by Blackburn and Cipriani (2005), and reciprocal transfers 
are conducted between two working groups, namely, young parents and 
their children.
According to Becker et al. (1990), the degree of parental altruism per 
child is negatively related to fertility rate. As countries develop, fertility 
rates decline, which in turn, increases the degree of parental altruism 
per child. In addition to one-way altruism, as mentioned in Becker et 
al. (1990), filial altruism can also be affected by demographic changes. 
According to the UN population division, the global fertility rate has 
halved over the last 50 years. Globally, the average woman has fewer 
than 2.5 children today. However, fertility rates in developing countries 
remain higher than those in developed countries. Having many children 
is rational for parents in less developed countries (especially with the 
low cost of child-rearing). The direction of intergenerational transfers 
then commences from children to parents. As a result, parental altru-
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ism before adjustment by fertility rate should be higher in developing 
countries. However, in more developed countries where the opportunity 
cost of child-rearing increases, parents desire less children but spend 
extra time and other resources to enhance the quality of the children. 
Thus, the transfer is redirected from parents to children, and each child 
receives extra time and physical resources from parents. As countries 
develop and fertility rate is reduced, the degree of parental altruism per 
child increases.
According to Koda and Uruyos (2017), the large size of families (more 
siblings) in developing countries implies less burden for each individual 
in relation to caring for elderly parents, because this burden can be 
shared among many siblings. In addition, if the elderly parents have a 
longer life expectancy as evidenced in developed countries, the amount 
of old-aged caring will be higher in these countries. As a result, filial 
altruism, before adjustment by demographic variables, should be higher 
in developed countries. However, after removing the demographic 
variables, the degrees of filial altruism are higher in developing 
countries and lower in developed countries. Demographic variables, 
therefore, can have substantial effects on discount rates or weights 
placed by each individual on the utility of one’s parents’ and children’s 
consumption.
We base our empirical analysis on the theoretical model developed by 
Koda and Uruyos (2017) with the goal of determining the relationship 
between the stages of economic development and preference 
parameters, namely, degrees of parental and filial altruism. Specifically, 
we tested whether (i) GDP per capita increases with the increase in 
parental altruism, and (ii) GDP per capita decreases with the increase 
in filial altruism. In this study, we investigate how the degrees of 
parental and filial altruism affect the stages of economic development. 
The dependent variable is GDP per capita, and the explanatory 
variables are parental and filial altruism, which are controlled by 
macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional variables. To estimate 
the abovementioned relationship, we employed the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
To overcome a possible endogeneity problem, we employed the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) method and generalized method of moments 
(GMM). Institutional collectivism values, in-group collectivism values, 
and linguistic fractionalization were selected as instrumental variables 
for parental and filial altruism.
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In this study, we find that levels of development are associated 
positively with degrees of parental altruism. However, these levels are 
negatively associated with the degrees of filial altruism, as highlighted 
in Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) and Koda and Uruyos (2017).1 The 
results are robust across various models of estimation and hold even 
after accounting for the possible endogeneity problem of altruism. 
The intuition behind these results is as follows. When the relationship 
between the degree of parental altruism and level of development is 
revealed, it has not been adjusted by demographic differences across 
countries. Individuals in less developed countries are more likely to 
have high fertility rates, which automatically increase the weight that 
they assign to their children’s consumption in their utility function. 
This weight, in turn, leads to large parental altruism in less developed 
countries. Conversely, with low fertility rates and longer longevity 
in highly developed countries, a positive relationship between filial 
altruism and levels of development is highly likely. Specifically, lower 
fertility rates and higher longevity in developed countries will result in 
an increase in the overall weight placed by individuals on their parent’s 
consumption. Nevertheless, after adjusting for demographic differences, 
a negative relationship between degree of filial altruism and levels of 
development is clearly seen. The low degree of parental altruism and 
high degree of filial altruism in developing countries are thus driven by 
high fertility and short life expectancy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents 
the concept and calculates the degrees of altruism using the National 
Transfer Accounts (NTA) data. Section III describes the empirical 
methodology and data. Section IV presents the empirical results. 
Section V concludes the paper.
II. Degrees of Parental and Filial Altruism
This section presents the main concept of the degrees of altruism, as 
1 Koda and Uruyos (2017) mainly discussed “demographically adjusted 
degrees of altruism,” which are different from the definition used in this paper. 
Furthermore, their conclusion is opposite to our results. In their paper, the 
adjusted degree of parental altruism (adjusted by demographic factors) decreases 
with the level of development, whereas that of filial altruism is positively related 
to levels of economic development.
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presented in Koda and Uruyos (2017). Their model introduces the less-
examined filial altruism that motivates sizable and increasing transfers 
to the elderly in addition to parental altruism that motivates transfers 
to children.
Koda and Uruyos (2017) developed a three-period overlapping-
generation model, wherein middle-aged agents care not only about 
their lifetime utility but also that of their old parents’ and children’s 
well-being. The economy consists of infinite generations of agents with 
perfect foresight. Each agent goes through three periods in a lifetime: 
child, young parent, and old parent. A representative agent derives 
utility from her young- and old-age consumption and from the old-
age consumption of her parent and child-period consumption of her 
children. For the representative agent born in period t – 1, her utility 
function is given by:2
 ( )θβθ α α− + +
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where β denotes the discounted rate of the agent’s old-age consump-
tion, θt+1 denotes the length of old-age period, 1 + n pertains to fertility 
rate, and αF and αP denote the degrees of filial and parental altruism, 
respectively. The first two terms represent self-consumption when an 
agent is young parent and old parent. The last two terms represent the 
altruism characteristics of this model. The third term represents an 
emotional benefit to the agent from the concurrent old-age consumption 
of her elderly parent 0tC . Notably, the weight placed by each individual 
on the consumption of her parents does not only depend on the degree 
of filial altruism αF, but also on the length of old-age period θt+1 and past 
fertility rate 1 + nt–1. The fourth term represents an emotional benefit 
from consumption of her children multiplied by the weight she puts on 
consumption of her children. This term does not only depend on the 
degree of parental altruism αP, but also on current fertility rate 1 + nt. 
Towards a fair comparison of the degrees of filial and parental altruism 
across countries, the demographic characteristics of each country 
2 Superscripts y and o denote young and old parents, respectively. A subscript 
denotes period.
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Table 1
Private and Public transfers, demograPhic data, 


















Argentina 1997 0.189 0.110 0.130 0.449 3.177 2.713 0.874 5.461
Australia 2010 0.202 0.182 0.010 0.301 2.577 1.838 1.006 2.882
Austria 2010 0.211 0.140 −0.003 0.530 2.150 1.422 0.984 3.412
Brazil 1996 0.380 0.061 −0.225 0.887 4.914 2.499 1.540 11.078
Cambodia 2009 0.291 0.030 0.158 0.043 6.323 4.452 1.204 53.030
Chile 1997 0.354 0.075 0.070 0.430 3.768 2.216 1.445 6.155
China 2002 0.231 0.083 0.120 0.160 4.627 1.859 0.574 4.324
Colombia 2008 0.122 0.083 0.844 0.466 5.219 2.613 0.430 8.559
Costa Rica 2004 0.317 0.082 0.027 0.429 4.620 2.649 1.447 7.190
Finland 2006 0.150 0.240 0.012 0.562 1.984 1.759 1.645 5.165
France 2011 0.232 0.224 −0.043 0.469 2.360 1.845 1.699 4.264
Germany 2003 0.238 0.148 −0.056 0.569 1.883 1.355 1.223 3.493
Hungary 2005 0.172 0.243 0.022 0.389 1.966 1.524 0.993 3.094
India 2004 0.302 0.030 0.112 0.029 5.362 3.541 0.912 15.920
Indonesia 2005 0.356 0.062 −0.083 0.011 5.102 2.795 1.142 9.122
Italy 2008 0.312 0.196 −0.037 0.554 2.166 1.306 1.862 4.264
Jamaica 2002 0.283 0.088 0.361 0.057 4.832 2.697 1.084 7.093
Japan 2004 0.295 0.209 0.040 0.473 1.950 1.446 2.509 5.348
Mexico 2004 0.392 0.095 −0.111 0.245 6.053 3.022 2.549 13.168
Peru 2007 0.333 0.144 −0.165 0.648 5.990 3.271 3.764 27.665
Philippines 1999 0.357 0.062 0.138 −0.003 6.026 3.939 3.084 28.303
Slovenia 2004 0.272 0.167 0.017 0.481 2.177 1.378 1.218 3.566
S. Africa 2005 0.214 0.136 −0.094 0.048 5.399 3.168 0.823 25.651
S. Korea 2000 0.374 0.121 0.137 0.147 4.031 1.435 1.059 3.881
Spain 2000 0.291 0.088 −0.069 0.315 2.640 1.325 0.811 2.159
Sweden 2003 0.227 0.210 −0.081 0.729 1.942 1.799 3.978 11.135
Taiwan 1998 0.372 0.158 0.300 0.176 3.692 1.527 1.458 4.889
Thailand 2004 0.312 0.112 0.260 −0.006 4.874 1.866 0.902 5.347
UK 2007 0.272 0.107 −0.002 0.338 2.259 1.763 0.997 2.788
USA 2003 0.238 0.177 −0.067 0.311 2.351 2.008 1.167 2.856
Uruguay 2006 0.433 0.086 −0.121 0.466 2.840 2.334 2.485 6.694
Sources: NTA and World Development Indicators
Notes:  Per capita transfers are normalized as the shares of average labor income. 
Total fertility rates are divided by two.
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should be primarily factored out to attain the pure degrees of filial and 
parental altruism.
A young parent’s education capital increases with inter-vivos 
bequests bt, which she received from her parents during her childhood 
and public transfers to children bp. Upon reaching her old parenthood, 
the same agent receives private transfers from her grown-up children gt 
and public transfers paid to the old parent gp.
The data compiled by the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) provide 
us with important insights into intergenerational transfers in 31 
countries in the system. The normalized per capita transfers in the 
form of income shares of the countries in the NTA system are presented 
in columns 1-4 of Table 1. Fertility rates of the current and previous 
generations are shown in columns 5 and 6. The degrees of altruism 
toward the elderly and children, denoted as αF and αP, respectively, were 
derived from the system of Equations (18) and (19) in Koda and Uruyos 
(2017), as presented in columns 7 and 8.
Figures 1 and 2 show the simple relations between the levels of 
development proxied by the logarithm of income per capita and the 
calculated degrees of parental and filial altruism, namely, αP and αF, 
respectively. Parental altruism values have an ambiguous relationship 
across countries through different stages of development. In Figure 
1, Sweden has the highest parental altruism at 3.98, whereas Colom-
bia has the lowest at 0.43. Roman Catholic countries, such as Peru, 
Philippines, Uruguay, and Mexico, have exceptionally high degrees 
of parental altruism. Interestingly, the degrees of filial altruism vary 
considerably, which may be caused by cultural differences. Figure 
2 shows that the country with the highest degree of filial altruism is 
Cambodia at 53.03, whereas Spain has the lowest at 2.16. Accordingly, 
developing countries have higher degrees of filial altruism compared 
with developed countries, and this finding is in line with the results in 
Blackburn and Cipriani (2005) and Koda and Uruyos (2017).
The next section considers the empirical determinants of levels of 
development, that is, the regression results that underlie the fitted 
values, as shown in Figure 1 and 2.
Based on the two relationships between degrees of altruism and 
levels of development in Figure 1 and 2, the following hypotheses will be 
tested.
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Hypothesis 1. The level of economic development is positively related to 
the degree of parental altruism.3
Hypothesis 2. The level of economic development is negatively related to 
the degree of filial altruism.
To validate these hypotheses, we perform multiple regression 
analysis.
3 Although we fail to see a clear relationship between GDP per capita and 
degrees of parental altruism, we hypothesize a positive relationship between 
them. As parents care more about the quality of their children, they tend to 
allocate more time on nurturing, nourishing, and educating to ensure that their 
children will be endowed with the ability to survive and take on advanced tasks 
in their adulthood. As a result, the GDP per capita should increase with the 
increase in parental altruism.
Source: WDI and Koda and Uruyos (2017)
Figure 1
degrees of Parental altruism
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III. Data and Methodology
A. Data
The sample of 31 countries (Table 1) covers a broad range of 
experience from developing to developed countries. The inclusive 
countries were determined based on the availability of the NTA data. 
To evaluate the impact of degrees of altruism on levels of development, 
we assembled a data set from 1996-2011 from various sources, such 
as the (i) World Development Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank, (ii) 
the NTA Project, (iii) the Polity IV Project from the Integrated Network 
for Societal Conflict Research, (iv) the World Factbook from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), (v) the Global Leadership and Organizational 
Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) project, and (vi) the data of Alesina 
et al. (2003). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita, which is averaged from 1996-2011. The main explanatory 
variables are the degrees of parental and filial altruism. The control 
variables consist of macroeconomic variables, such as physical capital 
Source: WDI and Koda and Uruyos (2017) 
Figure 2
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and human capital stocks, lagged inflation rate, lagged saving ratio, and 
lagged public education expenditure to GDP ratio. The demographic 
variables include total fertility rate and population growth rate of the 
previous generation. Institutional variables consist of Polity index 
and a dummy variable for a country with Catholics as the dominant 
religious group, and the instrumental variables include the institutional 
collectivism values, in-group collectivism values, and linguistic 
fractionalization. To resolve the possible endogeneity of inflation 
Table 2






GDPpc 24 9.30 1.27 6.60 10.62
Explanatory variables
ParentalAlt 24 1.44 0.84 0.43 3.98
FilialAlt 24 6.95 5.83 2.16 28.30
Physical Capital 24 25.58 1.57 22.21 28.56
Human Capital 24 49.75 22.42 12.25 86.81
Macroeconomic variables
Inflation_lag 24 64.16 182.46 2.20 772.85
Sav/GDP_lag 24 23.85 5.65 14.14 36.95
Pubed/GDP_lag 22 5.78 11.11 −0.09 53.99
Demographic variables
Popgr_lag 24 1.30 0.90 0.07 2.73
Fert_lag 24 2.91 1.21 1.60 5.27
Institutional variables
Polity 24 8.54 3.45 −7 10




24 4.75 0.49 3.84 5.57
In-Group Collectivism 
Values
24 5.64 0.30 5.12 6.25
Linguistic Fractionalization 24 0.25 0.27 0.00 0.84
Sources:  WDI, NTA Project, Polity IV Project, CIA World Factbook, Alesina et al. 
(2003), and GLOBE Project
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rate, saving ratio, and public education expenditure to GDP ratio, 
their lagged values were used. The combined dataset consisted of 24 
countries. Cambodia, Chile, Jamaica, Peru, South Africa, Taiwan, and 
Uruguay were excluded due to missing data. Table 2 provides the cross-
country descriptive statistics of each variable. Appendix Table 1 in the 
Appendix presents the definitions and sources of all variables.
B. Methodology
The level of development is assumed to be described by the following 
equation:
 GDPpci = β0 + β1ParentalAlti + β2FilialAlti + β3Controlsi + ε1i (2)
where subscript i indicates country; β1 and β2 are the coefficients of the 
interested degrees of parental (ParentalAlti) and filial altruism (FilialAlti), 
respectively; and β3 is a coefficient vector of macroeconomic, demo-
graphic, and institutional control variables. To estimate the abovemen-
tioned equation, the OLS method with heteroscedasticity robust stand-
ard errors is used.
To overcome a possible endogeneity problem, we developed an 
IV strategy to estimate the causal effect of altruism on GDP per 
capita (GDPpci). The instrumental variables include the following: 
(i) institutional collectivism values, which is the degree to which 
organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and 
reward the collective distribution of resources and collective action. 
Societies with high institutional collectivism values appreciate these 
characteristics, and their members assume that they are highly 
interdependent with the organization. Furthermore, group loyalty is 
encouraged, even if this undermines the pursuit of individual goals. The 
society’s economic system tends to maximize the interests of collectives. 
whereas rewards are driven by seniority, personal needs, and/or within-
group equity. (ii) In-group collectivism values refer to the degree to 
which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their 
organizations or families (House et al. 2004, p. 30). Societies with high 
in-group collectivism values appreciate these characteristics. Duties 
and obligations are important determinants of social behavior. A strong 
distinction is made between in- and out-groups, and as such, people 
emphasize relatedness with groups. A society with high values of these 
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two variables may tend to care more about their children. (iii) Linguistic 
fractionalization refers to the probability that two randomly selected 
people from a given country do not belong to the same ethnolinguistic 
group. Early work on social identity theory established that patterns 
of intergroup behavior can be understood considering that individuals 
may attribute positive utility to the wellbeing of members of their own 
group, and negative utility to that of members of other groups. High-
er fractionalization, which reflects a diversity society, may have had 
the effect of enhancing filial altruism. These variables are chosen as 
instrumental variables in the current study because they are highly 
correlated with degrees of parental and filial altruism. However, they 
are less likely to be determined by GDP per capita and vice versa. These 
variables should satisfy the inclusion and exclusion restrictions of the 
instrumental variables.
Accordingly, the IV model takes the following form:
 ParentalAlti = α0 + α1Instrumentsi + α2Controlsi + ε2i  (3)
 FilialAlti = γ0 + γ1Instrumentsi + γ2Controlsi + ε3i  (4)
  β β β ε= + + + +0 1 2 4 ,i ii iGDPpc ParentalAlt FilialAlt β3 iControls  (5)
where Equations (3) and (4) are the first-stage regressions for 
the degrees of parental (ParentalAlti) and filial (FilialAlti) altruism, 
respectively. Equation (5) is the second-stage regression of the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita (GDPpci). Instrumentsi is the set 
of instrumental variables, such as institutional collectivism, in-group 
collectivism, and linguistic fractionalization. Controlsi refers to the 
set of macroeconomic, demographic, and institutional controls. The 
coefficients of interest are β1 and β2. To estimate the abovementioned 
equations, the 2SLS method and GMM are employed because they are 
core methods for dealing with endogenous variables.
IV. Regression Results
This section presents the results from a regression of the stages of 
economic development, measured by the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita (GDPpc) on the degrees of parental (ParentalAlt) and filial 
(FilialAlt) altruism from 24 countries. Table 3 contains the regression 
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results for GDP per capita from 8 regression specifications. Each 
group of 3 columns in Table 3 shows the estimates for each regression 
specification obtained from three estimation methods, namely, OLS, 
2SLS, and GMM.
We begin by employing the basic Solow model augmented with hu-
man capital, which has been widely used in the literature on empirical 
growth to explain differences across countries in income levels and 
growth patterns. The model is based on a simple Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function with physical and human capital stocks. This simple 
model (the first specification) is denoted under the first three columns 
in Table 3, where only Physical Capital and Human Capital enter the 
regressions.
In the second to fourth specifications, macroeconomic variables, such 
as lagged inflation rate (Inflation_lag) (columns 4-6), lagged saving ratio 
(Sav/GDP_lag) (columns 7-9), and lagged public education expenditure 
to GDP ratio (Pubed/GDP_lag) (columns 10-12) individually enter the 
regressions. The lagged variables are used instead of the current 
ones to avoid the negative control problem in which they are possibly 
outcomes of the current levels of altruism. The rate of inflation captures 
the effect of monetary stability on the economy such that the coefficient 
is expected to be negative. Lagged saving ratio captures the process of 
physical capital accumulation, such that the coefficient is expected to 
be positive. Lagged public education expenditure to GDP ratio captures 
the process of human capital accumulation such that its coefficient is 
expected to be positive.
In the fifth and sixth specifications, demographic variables, such as 
the previous-generation values of population growth rate (Popgr_lag) 
(columns 13-15) and total fertility rate (Fert_lag) (columns 16-18) indi-
vidually enter the regressions. Their coefficients are expected to be neg-
ative, because the higher rate of population growth from the previous 
generation may discourage investment in human and physical capital 
stocks such that GDP per capita is lowered.
In the last two specifications, institutional variables, such as Polity 
(columns 19-21) and Catholic (columns 22-24), individually enter the 
regressions. A better institutional environment, including a higher lev-
el of democracy, should promote economic development such that the 
coefficient of Polity is expected to be positive. In our sample set, which 
includes various religious compositions, countries with Catholics as a 
dominant religious group tend to have relatively better institutional en-
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vironment. The coefficient of Catholic, therefore, is expected to be posi-
tive as well.
The F-statistics from the first stage regressions indicate that the 
instrumental variables enter the first stage regressions significantly. 
The underidentification test also rejects the null hypothesis of 
underidentified. In other words, the inclusion restrictions are satisfied, 
which suggests that the instrumental variables are relevant or 
correlates with the degrees of altruism. We can, therefore, believe 
that the instruments are not weak, and the 2SLS estimator is able 
Table 3
RegRessions of gDP PeR CaPita on the DegRees of altRuism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


































































N 24 24 24 24 24 24
adj. R2 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.83 0.79 0.76
RMSE 0.507 0.510 0.547 0.521 0.507 0.545








0.049 - - 0.017 -
Overidentification 
(p-value) -
0.373 - - 0.385 -
Endogeneity 
(p-value) -
0.429 - - 0.302 -
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. F-stat first stage is the joint probability of an 
F-test for the first stage regression. Underidentification is the probability of a test for 
underidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: underidentified). Overidentification is 
the probability of a test for overidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: instruments 
are valid). Endogeneity is the probability of the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (null 
hypothesis: regressors are exogenous).
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to provide precise estimates. The overidentification test accepts the 
null hypothesis of valid instruments. Therefore, it indicates that the 
instrumental variables are not correlated with the error term. In other 
words, the exclusion restrictions are satisfied. The moment conditions, 
therefore, can be said to be valid, and the GMM estimator should give 
consistent estimates. The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of exogenous regressors. This finding suggests that 
the endogeneity of the degrees of altruism should not be a large cause 
Table 3
(ContinueD)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
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N 24 24 24 22 22 22
adj. R2 0.88 0.84 0.85 0.89 0.88 0.88
RMSE 0.439 0.439 0.425 0.428 0.375 0.374








0.048 - - 0.016 -
Overidentification 
(p-value) -
0.635 - - 0.790 -
Endogeneity 
(p-value) -
0.397 - - 0.242 -
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. F-stat first stage is the joint probability of an 
F-test for the first stage regression. Underidentification is the probability of a test for 
underidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: underidentified). Overidentification is 
the probability of a test for overidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: instruments 
are valid). Endogeneity is the probability of the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (null 
hypothesis: regressors are exogenous).
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of concern.
Our main empirical question is whether the degrees of filial and pa-
rental altruism can explain income differences across countries. Con-
sistent with Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of parental altruism (Parenta-
lAlt) remains positive and statistically significant in all specifications, 
indicating that the degree of parental altruism has a positive relation-
ship with GDP per capita. A high level of parental altruism possibly 
Table 3
(Continued)
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
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N 24 24 24 24 24 24
adj. R2 0.85 0.79 0.75 0.87 0.78 0.73
RMSE 0.485 0.503 0.553 0.466 0.519 0.572








0.045 - - 0.095 -
Overidentification 
(p-value) -
0.349 - - 0.379 -
Endogeneity 
(p-value) -
0.800 - - 0.755 -
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. F-stat first stage is the joint probability of an 
F-test for the first stage regression. Underidentification is the probability of a test for 
underidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: underidentified). Overidentification is 
the probability of a test for overidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: instruments 
are valid). Endogeneity is the probability of the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (null 
hypothesis: regressors are exogenous).
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causes an increase in education investment and, thus, human capital 
accumulation, which eventually raises the countries’ standard of living. 
Alternatively, parents in a high altruism society may allocate further 
time and resources toward their children, such that each child incor-
porates a high quality of human capital stock, becomes productive, 
and produces large output, resulting in a high level of GDP per capita. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of filial altruism (FilialAlt) 
Table 3
(Continued)
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
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N 24 24 24 24 24 24
adj. R2 0.86 0.79 0.78 0.88 0.87 0.87
RMSE 0.468 0.505 0.522 0.449 0.396 0.396








0.060 - - 0.016 -
Overidentification 
(p-value) -
0.870 - - 0.683 -
Endogeneity 
(p-value) -
0.218 - - 0.860 -
Notes:  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. F-stat first stage is the joint probability of an 
F-test for the first stage regression. Underidentification is the probability of a test for 
underidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: underidentified). Overidentification is 
the probability of a test for overidentification restrictions (null hypothesis: instruments 
are valid). Endogeneity is the probability of the Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (null 
hypothesis: regressors are exogenous).
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remains negative and statistically significant in nearly all specifications, 
indicating that the degree of filial altruism has a negative relationship 
with GDP per capita. A high level of filial altruism possibly causes an 
increase in spending resources and time allocation on the elderly. These 
activities are likely considered non-productive in terms of GDP. Simul-
taneously, the increased resource allocation for the elderly reduces that 
for children, which in turn, lowers market productivity and eventually 
decreases the countries’ standard of living.
The coefficients of Physical Capital and Human Capital are always 
positive as expected, although they are not always statistically signif-
icant, suggesting that the physical and human capital accumulation 
processes raise GDP per capita. The coefficient of Inflation_lag is not 
negative or statistically significant, as expected. This finding implies 
that evidence for the notion that a high level of monetary instability 
that is captured by a high rate of lagged inflation lowers GDP per capi-
ta does not exist. The coefficient of lagged saving ratio (Sav/GDP_lag) is 
negative and statistically significant, which differs from that expected 
earlier. Given the same level of current physical capital stock, a country 
with high levels of lagged saving ratio may probably have an extremely 
low level of physical capital stock compared with those with low levels 
of lagged saving ratio. As a result, a country with high levels of lagged 
saving ratio has physical capital with inferior quality or embedded 
technology, which causes a low level of GDP per capita. The coefficient 
of lagged public education expenditure to GDP ratio (Pubed/GDP_lag) 
is negative and statistically significant. Again, this finding differs from 
that expected earlier. Similarly, given the same level of current human 
capital, a country with high levels of lagged public education expend-
iture to GDP ratio has an extremely low level of human capital. As a 
result, such a country has human capital with inferior quality, which 
then leads to a low level of GDP per capita. Alternatively, a high level of 
public education expenditure may indicate inefficiency in the educa-
tion system, especially in developing countries. Inferior schools in these 
countries may come at a high cost. Expenditures may not be made 
wisely, such that they do not improve the quality of human capital and 
do not, therefore, contribute to the increase in GDP per capita.
The coefficient of population growth rate from the previous generation 
(Popgr_lag) is negative as expected but statistically non-significant. The 
coefficient of total fertility rate from the previous generation (Fert_lag) 
is statistically non-significant as well. Surprisingly, evidence of demo-
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graphic difference on the steady-state level of GDP per capita does not 
exist in this sample. This occurrence might be explained by variations 
in population growth rate and total fertility rate, which are insufficiently 
large to ensure significance. As expected, the coefficient of Polity index 
is positive and statistically significant, indicating that a country with a 
high level of democracy tends to have a high level of GDP per capita. In 
other words, democracy reflects a relatively high extent of democratic 
rights, such as freedom to vote and freedom of speech, that provide a 
good atmosphere for business and raise the productivity of a country. 
The coefficient of Catholic is positive and statistically significant in the 
majority of cases, which might be caused by the ad hoc selection of 
country sample (in which the NTA is used). We presume that Catholic 
countries tend to be countries with high levels of GDP per capita.
The regression results are relatively similar across the three esti-
mation methods used. The magnitude of the coefficients is not sys-
tematically different across estimators. Importantly, even when other 
control variables (e.g., macroeconomic, demographic, and institution-
al variables) are included in the model and when various estimation 
methods are employed to estimate the model, the degrees of parental 
and filial altruism remain positive and negative, respectively, as well 
as statistically and significantly related to GDP per capita. This paper 
does not attempt to provide a comprehensive explanation of the levels 
of economic development. Our contribution lies in complementing 
the latent concepts of altruism to the existing explanation of GDP per 
capita. In our regression models, we include a series of controls to rule 
out the confounding factors that would bias our estimates of the effects 
of altruism on GDP per capita. We find that the degrees of altruism 
still have more significant effects than many other variables that were 
previously examined in the literature.
V. Conclusion
In this study, we employed data from 24 countries to estimate the 
degrees of parental and filial altruism and its effect on the stages of eco-
nomic development. We found that levels of development are positively 
associated with degrees of parental altruism and negatively with those 
of filial altruism.
To estimate the abovementioned relationship, the OLS method with 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors was used. To overcome a 
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possible endogeneity problem, we employed 2SLS and GMM. The de-
pendent variable is GDP per capita, and the explanatory variables are 
parental and filial altruism, which are controlled for by using macroe-
conomics, demographic, and institutional variables. We found that GDP 
per capita is negatively associated with filial altruism and positively 
associated with parental altruism. The results are robust across differ-
ent models of estimation and hold even after accounting for the possible 
endogeneity problem of altruism. The low degree of parental altruism 
and high degree of filial altruism in developing countries are driven by 
high fertility and short life expectancy. Therefore, policymakers should 
jointly consider both economic and demographic policies when enacting 
policies to improve economic well-being in such countries.




Variable (unit) Definition Source
GDPpc The natural logarithm of GDP per capita, which is 
calculated using GDP divided by midyear population 
and averaged from 1996 to 2011.
WDI




FilialAlt Emotional benefit from the concurrent consumption 
of each old parent.
Koda and 
Uruyos (2017)
Physical Capital The natural logarithm of gross fixed capital formation, 
such as plant, machinery, and equipment purchases, 
which is averaged from 1996 to 2011.
WDI
Human Capital The average value of total enrollment in the tertiary 
level from 1996 to 2011, which is expressed as the 
percentage of the total population of the five-year age 
group that follows secondary education.
WDI
Inflation_lag The average value of inflation rate from 1980 to 1995 
as measured by the consumer price index, which 
reflects the annual percentage change in cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and 
services.
WDI
Sav/GDP_lag The average value of gross domestic savings from 
1980 to 1995 as measured by GDP less final 
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
WDI
Pubed/GDP_lag The average value of public education expenditure 
from 1980 to 1995 as measured by general 
government expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP, which includes expenditure 
funded by transfers from international sources to the 
government.
WDI
Popgr_lag The average value of the annual population growth 
rate from 1965 to 1995. Population is based on the 
de facto definition of population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.
WDI
Fert_lag The average value of total fertility rate from 1965 to 
1995 represents the average number of children that 
would be born to a woman if she were to live up to 
the end of her childbearing years and bear children in 
accordance with age-specific fertility rates.
WDI
Polity An average polity score from 1996 to 2011 is 
computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from 
the DEMOC score. The resulting unified polity scale 




Catholic A dummy variable for a country with Roman Catholic 





The degree to which organizational and societal 
institutional practices encourage and reward collective 




The degree to which individuals express (and should 





Linguistic fractionalization indices range from 0 to 1 
estimate the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals use different languages.
Alesina et al. 
(2003)
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